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We construct and estimate an economic model of religious giving. We employ a dynamic 
consumer optimization model with mortality in which intra-temporal utility stems from both 
consumption and religious contributions. Individuals also decide how to allocate resources 
between religious contributions (which have both a this-life consumption value and an after-
life investment value) and other consumption expenditures. If religious contributions do not 
have an after-life investment value, the ratio of contributions to consumption expenditures 
should be unrelated to the probability of death. However, if there is an investment value from 
religious giving, individuals should allocate a greater share of their income to religious 
contributions as their probability of death increases. We estimate the model using data from 
the Consumer Expenditure Survey on the consumption and religious contribution patterns of a 
repeated cross-section of households and of a synthetic cohort panel. We find strong evidence 
that individuals behave as if religious contributions have a value in the after-life, in a manner 
consistent with the after life-cycle model. The estimates of the structural parameters of the 
model also imply that while after-life investment considerations (i.e. impending death) are an 
important determinant of the life-cycle profile of religious contributions, within-life (i.e. 
religious consumption) factors pin down a household’s average level of religious 
contributions over a lifetime. 
JEL Code: H1, H5, H8. 
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58 percent of Americans’ charitable giving during their lifetimes is directed towards religious orga-
nizations, more than the fraction to charitable organizations (33 percent), or political contributions
(2 percent).1 At least some of this behavior likely stems from the United States being a fairly
religious country; nearly 9 out of 10 Americans believe in God, more than 4 in 10 attend religious
services every week or almost every week.2 Recently, a growing body of research has resurfaced
on the economics of religion. Iannaccone (1998) surveys the issues that have arisen since the sem-
inal paper by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) more than thirty years ago. Iannaccone notes that with
regards to economic explanations of religious giving, “income and wage eﬀects are almost always
dwarfed by those of age, gender and religious upbringing.”
While the research to date has much to say on the economic determinants of religious
participation, the literature does not easily lend itself to more structural economic interpretations.
By construction, the theoretical models are descriptive and, by design, the econometric models are
estimated as reduced forms. So, while we may learn that certain socio-economic factors are integral
to religious activity, we do not have estimates of economic parameters that we can readily identify.
The purpose of our paper is to develop and directly estimate an economic model of religious giving.
Our research methodology provides a structural interpretation for religious giving, allowing us to
estimate the separate inﬂuences of this-life (i.e. consumption) versus concerns about the after-life
(i.e. investment).
1Based on authors calculations from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
2The poll was taken January 31 2001 by the Gallup polling organization. Using Michigan Time-Use Studies,
Biddle (1992) argues attendance rates are actually 15 percent lower than reported by gallup.
12 Literature Review
The seminal paper in the economics of religion is by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975). They employ
a very simple model in which households choose between economic goods and devotional goods
across time. The implications from the model are straightforward: church attendance rises with
wealth and falls with income. Correspondingly, as the returns to market activity decline with
age, it follows that attendance should rise with age, as the “forces which generate a monotonically
declining human-capital investment proﬁle with age will also generate a monotonically increasing
‘religious-capital-investment proﬁle’ with age.” To test their theory they appeal to various survey
data, aggregated to the state-level.
Long and Settle (1977), however, challenged their result using individual data from a Wis-
consin Survey Research Laboratory. They show that once you include various individual charac-
teristics, then there is less (no) impact of wealth, income and age in determining attendance. In
response, Ehrenberg (1977) employed a sample of over 5600 females and their spouses in the 1965
National Fertility Survey to reconﬁrm their original results: he once again shows how important is
age in determining ‘religiosity’.3
We believe that reconciling alternative driving forces of religiosity has been hampered by
a lack of economic formalization. In the preceding literature, preferences are noted to be one of
the most important channels through which religion may aﬀect behavior, however, there is less
attention to how one might integrate religion into preferences using more recent advances. As age
is conjectured to be an important factor in religiosity, it would make sense to appeal to a preference
structure that explicitly models intertemporal decision-making. One contribution of our paper is
3Given the lack of consensus on the empirical front, another line of the literature has concentrated on formalizing
the theory before moving towards the data. For example, in Stark, Iannoccone and Finke (1996) and Montgomery
(1996), the focal point of the debate centers on deﬁning how to integrate the concept of ‘irrational’ religion into a
rational framework.
2to address this shortcoming in the literature.
Obviously, participating in religious activities goes beyond attendance making it useful to
examine how these activities directly impact spending. Dahl and Ransom (1999) surveyed 1200
Mormons to see the importance of one’s economic situation on the demand for tithing. They
found that ﬁnancial status alone could not explain the decision to tithe. Gruber (2004) tests the
hypothesis that as wages increase religious participation will be reﬂected to a greater extent through
contributions rather than though attendance; using the CEX and the General Social Survey he
ﬁnds an implied elasticity of attendance with respect to religious giving of -0.9. These results taken
together imply that there are other factors that drive religious giving besides income or wealth such
as religious participation.
There is an extensive literature on the consequences of religious participation, surveyed
in Iannaccone (1998). Additional new contributions on the economics of religiosity include the
following: Glaeser et al (2005) present an information-based model of religious extremism. They
show that political parties will adopt relatively extreme religious positions in their platforms in
order to increase turnout among party members. This strategic extremism is largest when close to
50 percent of the population is religious. Barro and McCleary (2003) argue that there is a causal link
between economic growth and religious attendance and belief. Gruber (2005) ﬁnds that increased
religious participation leads to higher educational attainment and income, less dependence on social
insurance programs and higher rates of marriage. Jeitschko, OConnell, and Pecchenino (2005)
develop a model in which spirituality – determined by both tithing and other religious activities
– can increase both mental and physical health. Dehejia, DeLeire, and Luttmer (2005) ﬁnd that
households who participate in religious organizations are better able to smooth consumption after
experiencing declines in income.
3Given these links, and the fact that the literature on religious attendance points to age as
an important determinant, one would imagine that there should be a general model of religious over
the life-cycle giving in which age related factors is a deciding factor. The purpose of our paper is to
build such a model, estimate it, and interpret the economic consequences for religiosity. We begin
with a simple intertemporal utility maximization problem in which households allocate spending
between economic and religious activities. We introduce the ability to store religiosity over time
and a varying probability of survival. In particular, individuals can obtain utility from enjoying
the beneﬁts of religious giving in this life (i.e. consumption) and in the next (i.e. investment).
We use data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to estimate our model. The
CEX data is ideal for our analysis because it allows us to identify important changes and signiﬁcant
trends in American consumer spending and compare these to changes in religious giving. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics surveyed over 300,000 diﬀerent families between 1982 and 1998 on their
detailed expenditures (including religious contributions). We both employ this micro-level data
directly and similar data from the General Social Survey (GSS) which contains comprehensive data
on social issues, intergroup relations and religion. We use the CEX and GSS together to create
a synthetic cohort panel on which to also estimate our model. Importantly, we can estimate our
model’s key parameters both using the household-level data and the synthetic cohort panel.
The results from our empirical work conﬁrm the previous research that highlights the im-
portance of economic factors in inﬂuencing religiosity, even after controlling for individual and time
speciﬁc factors. But more to the point, we are able to extract structural parameters from our model
that allow us to quantify the relevant importance of giving as a consumption good versus giving
as an investment good. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 of the paper
provides a description of our theoretical model, while Section 4 provides simulations to describe
4the model’s life cycle implications for religious giving. Section 5 provides a description of our data
and the methodology we employ in Section 6, our empirical section. Finally, we provide concluding
remarks in Section 7.
3 Theory
In this section, we develop our theoretical model that we test in the ensuing sections. The theoretical
model follows the standard model of life-cycle consumption with three notable diﬀerences. First,
we allow for the possibility that the stock of religious contributions can be stored and provide
value after death. Second, we explicitly model the probability of survival. Finally, unlike Azzi and
Ehrenberg (1975), we focus on expenditures rather than time considerations in religious activity.
We begin by describing the preferences of individuals. Individuals derive utility through
consumption of market goods and through being a ﬁnancially contributing member of a religious
organization. Individual i derives utility, U, through the ﬂow of private consumption, c, and their
stock of contributions, s, in the current period t:
Uit = U(cit,sit) (1)
where Uc > 0, Ucc < 0; Us > 0; Uss < 0; Ucs < 0.
The ﬂow of religious contributions, τit, can be stored each period in the stock of contribu-
tions, sit, such that the dynamics of the stock of religious contributions is given by:
sit = δ · sit−1 + τit (2)
The term δ captures the eﬀect of net depreciation on past religious contributions. Note that if
δ = 0, then there is no storage and in each period the stock of religious contributions will be
equal to tithing in that period. Alternatively, if δ = 1, then the individual’s accumulated stock
5of contributions is equal to their lifetime sum of religious giving.4 The stock of contributions, sit,
along with private consumption, cit, contribute to within lifetime utility.
Tithing over the individual’s lifetime has some additional beneﬁt as the stock of contribu-
tions has some ‘after-life’ value, Ω, in the event the individual dies where:
Ωit = Ω(sit) (3)
where Ω0 > 0 and Ω00 < 0. There is some probability Pit+1 that the individual will not survive
from today, period t, until next period, period t + 1. Therefore, conditional on being alive at time
t, individual i at period t has the following preference function:
U(cit,sit) + Pit+1 · Ω(sit) (4)
where Pit+1 is the ith individual’s probability of dying before making it to period t+1, conditional
on having survived until period t. Importantly, religious contributions provide beneﬁts both in this
life, U(.) and the next, Ω(.). Accordingly, from the perspective of time period zero, for any given
period t the individual i has the following preference function:
Φit · U(cit,sit) + Σit+1 · Ω(sit) (5)
where Φit is the unconditional probability that individual i is alive at time t and Σit+1 is the
unconditional probability that the individual dies at the beginning of (i.e. before making it to)
time period t + 1. Note that since Pit is the probability that the individual dies in period t,
the probability that he is alive at time t is Φit ≡ Πt
j=0(1 − Pij).5 Also note that unconditional
4Historically speaking, another motivation for this speciﬁcation would be the Catholic Church’s adoption of in-
dulgences which were sold as a way to purchase the forgiveness of sins and/or reduce time in Purgatory. They were
started during the reigns of Popes Pascal I (817-824) and John VIII (872-882) as a way of generating revenue, but
became a focal point of criticism during the Reformation. In 1567 Pope Pius V cancelled all grants of indulgences
involving any fees or other ﬁnancial transactions.
5It follows that the individual is alive at time 0, so that Pi0 = 0 and Φi0 = 1.
6probability that the individual dies at beginning of (i.e. before making it to) time period t + 1 is
Σit+1 ≡ Φit · Pit+1.
The individual chooses a path for next period’s wealth (Wit+1) and their current stock of
contributions (sit) by choosing a sequence of consumption of goods (cit) and religious contributions





βt [Φit · U(cit,sit) + Σit+1 · Ω(sit)] (6)
According to expression (6), the ﬁrst term describes that the individual maximizes his
discounted expected utility from consuming non-religious goods, cit and his stock of contributions,
sit, in this life. The second term denotes that the individual also takes into account the expected
payoﬀ (i.e. the salvage/salvation value) from the stock of religious contributions at time t, Ω(sit),
if he were, having survived until period t, to die before making it to time period t+1. This occurs
with probability Σit+1. To complete the problem, the individual maximizes expression (6) subject
to the stock of contributions (2) and wealth equations:
Wit+1 = R(Wit + yit − cit − τit) (7)
where Wi0 > 0 and si−1 = 0. Expression (7) is the standard intertemporal wealth constraint where
Wit is the stock of wealth held by individual i at the start of period t, yit is his or her period t labor
income, and spending takes the form of non-religious spending, cit and religious contributions, τit.
The gross rate of return on wealth is equal to R.
Iterating the wealth constraint (7) forward, substituting out τit using expression (2), and









R−t (yit − cit − sit + δsit−1)
#
(8)
7where λ is the shadow value of wealth. The intertemporal optimality equations for the optimal
choice of cit and sit are, respectively:
βtΦitUcit = λ · R−t (9)
βt(ΦitUsit + Σit+1Ω0(sit)) = λ · R−t · (1 − (δ/R)) (10)
where δ/R < 1. Expression (9) is a slightly modiﬁed version of the standard equation for the
marginal utility of wealth. Plugging expression (9) into (10) and re-arranging yields:
Usit/Ucit + Pit+1Ω0(sit)/Ucit = 1 − (δ/R) (11)
Expression (11) tells us that individuals will balance the mortality adjusted marginal utility of
religious contributions (that aﬀect both period t utility and after-life utility) with the marginal
utility of consumption (that only aﬀects current period utility). This equation also yields two
intuitive implications.
First, the extra term of the marginal value of religious contributions to utility through its
(mortality adjusted) eﬀect on the after-life value means that the marginal utility of consumption
needs to be higher (that is, consumption needs to be lower and contributions to be higher) in every
period than if Ω(sit) were zero. That is, if religious contributions have both an investment value
and a consumption value, contributions will be greater and consumption of market goods will be
less than if religious contributions had only a consumption value.
Second, as the probability of death increases (that is, the term, Pit+1 gets larger) the
marginal utility of religious contributions through its aﬀect on the after-life value gets larger. In
response and to compensate, the marginal value of consumption must rise (that is, consumption
must fall and contributions must increase). Thus, ceteris paribus, as the probability of death
increases, the ratio of religious contributions to consumption will increase.
8We now parameterize the utility function as: U(cit,sit) = log(cit) + α · log(sit) as well as
the salvage value of the stock of contributions at the time of death, namely Ω(sit) = Ω · log(sit).
Using these functional forms in expression (11) and re-arranging we obtain:
sit/cit = [1 − (δ/R)]
−1 [α + Ω · Pit+1] (12)
Intuitively, the individual accumulates a larger stock of contributions vis-a-vis his consumption
expenditures if his probability of death rises (Pit+1), if he values his stock of religious contributions
more in this life (α) or in the next life (Ω), and as the relative rate of return for accumulating the
stock of religious contributions rises vis-a-vis accumulating wealth (δ/R).
Unfortunately, unless we make a number of additional assumptions, we cannot estimate
expression (12). For instance, since we do not directly observe sit, we could make the strong
assumptions that δ = 1 and that we observe an individual or cohorts entire lifetime path of religious
contributions in order to construct a series for sit as the sum of all past τit’s. However, rather
than make such rigid assumptions, we can also derive an equation relating the ﬂow of religious
contributions to other observable variables. For instance, we can re-arrange (12) to obtain:
sit = [1 − (δ/R)]
−1 [α + Ω · Pit+1]cit (13)
The lagged expression of (13) is:
sit−1 = [1 − (δ/R)]
−1 [α + Ω · Pit]cit−1 (14)
Subtracting expression (14) from (13) using (2) we obtain:
τit = [1 − (δ/R)]
−1 [(α + ΩPit+1)cit − δ(α + ΩPit)cit−1] (15)
Dividing through both sides by cit and using the intertemporal consumption optimality condition
9that c−1
it−1 = βR(1 − Pit)c−1
it yields:6
τit/cit = [1 − (δ/R)]
−1






Again, the intuition for expression (16) follows closely that of expression (12): namely, the individual
contributes more vis-a-vis his consumption expenditures if his probability of death rises (Pit+1),
if he values his stock of religious contributions more in this life (α) or in the next life (Ω), and
as the relative rate of return for accumulating the stock of religious contributions rises vis-a-vis
accumulating wealth (δ/R).
The expression for the tithing ratio, τ/c, is clearly non-linear in the parameters, α, Ω and
δ/R, as well as the probability of death. To better clarify the relationship, using the fact that
1/(1 − Pit) = 1 + (Pit/(1 − Pit)), expression (16) becomes:


















Notice that the coeﬃcient on Pit+1 is positive, while that on Pit/1 − Pit is negative.
4 Simulations
To more closely examine the model’s implications for religious contributions, we specify functional
forms, and parameter values to trace out the predicted life-cycle patterns for consumption and
religious contributions under alternative scenarios. First, we begin with the case where individuals
value religiosity (i.e. there is a current period utility value of religious contributions), they value the
‘after-life’ of past contributions (i.e. investment), and they can accumulate religious contributions
over time (i.e. the rate of depreciation of these contributions is low).
Figure 1 plots the cohort life-cycle path of the religious contribution to consumption ratio
using the CEX data as well as the simulated life cycle paths from expression (17) – see section 5
6This latter condition is just the intertemporal consumption smoothing expression, for log utility, derived from
expressing (9) at time t − 1 and t and combining terms.











































































 for a description of the data and cohort methods.7 We begin by describing the actual data. The
tithing measure (i.e. the religious contribution to consumption ratio) starts at just under 3 percent
per year when a cohort is 30 years old and rises four-fold to over 10 percent by the time a cohort
is in its mid-80’s.
The simulated life-cycle proﬁles obviously depend on the underlying structural parameters,
α, Ω and δ/R as well as the probability of death.8 We consider three combinations of parameter
values to highlight their relative contribution to the life cycle paths. In case 1, contributions by
individuals are primarily an investment in the after-life. In this case, we set α = 0.02, Ω = 0.350
and δ/R = 0.83 = 0.875/1.05. Notice that the simulated path provides a reasonable ﬁt of the
data. In contrast, in case 2 contributions are not as useful an investment in the after-life. For this
case, we signiﬁcantly reduce Ω to Ω = 0.01. Accordingly, the ratio of tithing to consumption is
much ﬂatter than in either case 2 or in the actual data. Hence, as demonstrated in expression (17),
Ω is an important variable in determining the steepness of the tithing proﬁle. Finally, in case 3,
individuals have a tremendously reduced ability to store the stock of religious contributions. We
do this by setting δ/R = 0.1. We return the value of Ω to 0.350 though we increase the value of α
in order to reasonably match the simulated tithing ratio to the data at age 30.9 Note that again,
with a reduced value for δ/R, the slope of the tithing proﬁle for case 3 in Figure 1 is ﬂatter.
In summary, two things are likely to be important in terms of matching the data. First,
the investment aspect of religious giving must be relatively important in the life-cycle (i.e. as the
probability of death rises) as compared to the consumption aspect of religious giving in order to
7The data used in Figure 1 are based on data averaged over all cohorts.
8Note that in all the simulations, we set β = .95. The death probabilities were obtained from the Berkeley
Mortality Database (2002). These data are based on life tables constructed by the Oﬃce of the Actuary of the Social
Security Administration. The probability of death data used in Figure 1 are based on the average probability of
death across all cohorts.
9Again, as expression (17) indicates, α has a strong inﬂuence on the tithing ratio when the probabilities of death
are small. Indeed, with β = 1, α is the tithing rate with a zero probability of death.
11explain the steepness of the tithing proﬁle. Second, an important feature to giving must be that
there is some storage value to holiness via the lifetime stock of religious contributions. We next
turn to our data from the CEX and estimate our (after) life-cycle model of religious contributions.
5 Data and Methods
In this section, we describe the data employed in the paper and how we estimate the model we
developed in the preceding section.
5.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this sub-section we present a descriptive data analysis to compare our results to previous research
and data. As we will see below, families from the Midwest and South, with more education, higher
income, larger families spend more on religious activities than other families. Importantly, religious
giving also appears to increase with age in a fundamentally diﬀerent manner than other types of
related spending such as spending on charitable activities and on political campaigns.
The data for this study came from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which was
developed to provide information on consumer behavior. We use data from the 1982 through 1998
panels of the CEX.10 The CEX is a nationally representative survey of roughly 5,000 households
per year, is the basic source of data for the construction of the items and weights in the market
basket of consumer purchases to be priced for the Consumer Price Index, and is widely regarded
as the best source of U.S. consumption expenditure data. It contains information on the income
and demographic characteristics of the household as well as detailed household-level information on
expenditures. Each household is interviewed up to four times at three-month intervals and three
months of expenditure data are collected retrospectively at each quarterly interview. Income over
10Our data set ends in 1998 due to the following two constraints. First, the religious contributions question on the
CEX was changed after the late 1990’s, and thus made the pre-change responses incomparable to post-change ones.
As well, the General Social Survey was taken only in even years after 1998.
12the past 12 months is asked in the ﬁrst and last interviews. In the last interview, data on ﬁve types
of contributions over the past year are collected. These are contributions to religious organizations,
charitable organizations, political organizations, educational organizations, and miscellaneous con-
tributions.11 Our measure of total consumption is based on the expenditure data reported in the
CEX; consumption of goods provided in-kind is not measured in the Consumer Expenditure Survey
and is therefore excluded from our measure of consumption. The CEX, therefore, provides a richly
detailed data source to test the implications of our theory.
There are several limitations to directly employing the CEX data to address all of the
empirical implications directly related to our model. For example, the CEX does not ask ques-
tions relating to religious aﬃliation which have been shown to have strong explanatory power in
determining religiosity [see Innaconne (1998)]. In order to examine this role, we include religious
denominations in our data by linking the CEX data to cross-sections of the General Social Sur-
vey (GSS) using synthetic cohort data analysis. As a robustness check, we then compare these
results to estimates using the CEX micro-level data which excludes religious denominations but
includes additional important demographic information. As we demonstrate below, the results for
the estimated structural parameters are consistent across the two estimation strategies.
The GSS contains religious, demographic and sociological information on 38,116 households
from 1982 to 1998. We create cohort-level variables in both datasets and then merge them by birth
cohort (decade of birth), ethnicity (white and non-white), education (less than high school, high
school graduate, some college), and region (West, Midwest, South and Northeast). The resulting
synthetic cohort panel data is thus given as:
birth cohorts*ethnicity*education*region*year = 7 ∗ 2 ∗ 3 ∗ 4 ∗ 18 = 3024.
11About 40 percent of households make a contribution to a religious organization and these contributions represent
about 1.2 percent of household income in the CEX. These ﬁndings are consistent with other sources (according to
Iannaccone 1998, total religious contributions represent roughly 1 percent of GNP).
13However, as some birth cohorts are not present in each year of our sample and because the GSS
does not have religious aﬃliation data for all years of the CEX sample, we have an unbalanced
panel of over 1,600 observations.12 It is also important to note that the sample size of the GSS is
not large enough to allow for variation at the region level, though religious aﬃliations in the cohort
sample do vary by birth cohort, ethnicity, education, and year.
Table 1 provides summary statistics (means and standard deviations) from the micro-level
household CEX data. Each column represents a diﬀerent variable in the dataset – level of real
consumption (in 1998 dollars), level of religious giving, annual income, and tithing (religious con-
tributions as a percent of total non-religious consumption), and the number of observations in each
row. Each row provides a diﬀerent parsing of the data, e.g. by those that gave some amount
(GIVERS), those with income greater than average (RICH), etc. There are three empirical reg-
ularities. First, for those that give a positive amount, ‘GIVERS’ tithe about 3.6 percent of their
total consumption compared with 1.4 percent for all households. Second, those with above average
income (i.e. the ‘RICH’) only give a slightly greater portion of their income. Third, households
headed by people over the age of 60 tithe a greater share than do younger households.
As demonstrated by the theory, a primary determinant of religious giving is the likelihood of
death. For our study, the death probabilities were obtained from the Berkeley Mortality Database
(2002). These data are based on life tables constructed by the Oﬃce of the Actuary of the Social
Security Administration (SSA) and vary across year and cohort. We then use the relative mortality
factors from Brown, Liebman, and Pollet (2002) to adjust these data and create death probabilties
12It is important to note that parsing the data by education, ethnicity, region and year does not qualitatively
impact our empirical results. We considered three other alternative parsings — ﬁrst, creating synthetic cohorts based
on decade of birth using only the CEX; second, linking this to GSS data and including religious denominations; and
ﬁnally, linking the GSS to CEX by birth cohort, education and race (i.e. not by region). In each case our general
results were similar to those described below.
14Table 1: Basic Micro-level Statistics 1982-1998
(1998 CONSTANT DOLLARS)
GROUP CONSUMPTION GIVING INCOME TITHE NOBS
TOTAL 32,841 412 32,392 0.014 87,781
(s.d.) 33,006 1,393 31,349 0.048
ALL GIVERS 38,172 1,101 39,767 0.036 32,698
(s.d.) 35,398 2,104 33,073 0.072
RICH 47,754 671 61,406 0.016 33,321
(s.d.) 38,732 1,813 30,633 0.058
BLACK 21,936 327 21,505 0.014 9,386
(s.d.) 19,695 1,119 22,663 0.035
29 < AGE < 61 40,591 518 41,114 0.013 34,118
(s.d.) 37,443 1,670 36,191 0.035
AGE > 60 24,763 493 22,850 0.022 21,461
(s.d.) 27,485 1,444 29,323 0.076
FAMSIZE3 37,952 436 38,186 0.012 13,907
(s.d.) 33,528 1,448 33,019 0.032
FAMSIZE4 43,756 489 43,516 0.012 12,566
(s.d.) 38,768 1,338 35,423 0.029
MARRIED 41,277 576 41,620 0.016 49,722
(s.d.) 37,754 1,703 34,775 0.054
Notes: Each column reports average real consumption, religious contributions (GIVING), income and tithe (GIVING/CONSUMPTION) with associated
standard deviation (s.d.) and number of observations (NOBS). Each row provides a diﬀerent parsing of the data: TOTAL provides data for entire sample,
ALL GIVERS provide data for those with positive religious contributions, and RICH provides data for those with above average income. 29 < AGE < 61 and
AGE > 60 provides data for heads of households in that age bracket, MARRIED and BLACK provides data for those heads of households who so designate
these categories, and FAMSIZE3 and FAMSIZE4 provides data for those with family sizes of 3 and 4, respectively. Data are in 1998 Constant Dollars.
15that vary by year, cohort, race, and education level. Note that the life tables yield the probability
that a person of a certain age will have died in a particular year–between the ages 29-88. While
separate lifetables by sex are available, we do not use them because the only gender information
we have is for the head of household, which is not particularly useful as a measure of gender for
this study.13 A description of the methodology used to construct the SSA tables can be found in
Bell, et al (1992).
Our next step was to ensure that our data are consistent with that in other data sets. We
are also interested in seeing what sorts of phenomena we were able to observe in our data that
was unavailable in some of the other studies. To examine and compare our data, Figure 2 plots
the mean contribution and fraction of households contributing to religious organizations from 1982
to 1998. Two facts can be gleaned from Figure 2. First, both the magnitude of giving (a median
contribution of around $450 per year) and the percent of families that give (around 40 percent) are
large. These numbers are not inconsistent with what others have reported. Hrung (2004) uses the
1999 survey of Giving and Volunteering in the United States and reports that the average annual
religious contributions was $465 which was more than double that of non-religious giving. Second,
while the percent of families that give has declined over time, the magnitude of giving among givers
has actually increased in real terms during the same time period.
Figure 3 plots the fraction of households contributing and median contributions versus
a variety of factors that have been found to signiﬁcantly impact religiosity. The top left panel
plots religious giving against income, the top right panel plots religious giving against education,
the bottom left panel plots religious giving against family size and the bottom right panel plots
religious giving against age. Figure 3 demonstrates that there appears to be a strongly positive and
linear relationship between income, education, family size and giving. Figure 3 also demonstrates
13Note that the results are unaﬀected if one include these gender based lifetables.
16 
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 that there is a strongly positive relationship between age and giving. Interestingly, there appears
to be a slight diﬀerence here between the amount and percent of giving once households turn 60.
A greater fraction of the oldest households make religious contributions, albeit at a lower amount.
The results demonstrated by Figure 3 are consistent with what others have found. Inna-
conne (1998) employs cross-sections of the General Social Survey from 1986 to 1990 to demonstrate
a similar result - giving is positively and statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with education, in-
come, family size and age. In summary, our data appears to be highly consistent with other data
in the household religiosity literature.
Given the strong similarities in our data to other data and the richness of the CEX ques-
tionnaire, we decided to employ a variety of variables in our analysis that have not been explored
in some of the other work. As a preliminary check on our data, we have examined consumption
components varied by age. One of our central conjectures is that as individuals age, they are more
likely to be religious (or at least raise their religious contribution as a ratio to their total con-
sumption) as they their proximity to a possible afterlife increases. Hence, our theory implies that
if individuals are concerned with the after-life, consumption of religious activities should increase
with age.
Figure 4 plots total expenditure and relevant subcategories using our synthetic cohort data.
Each line in the panels represent a diﬀerent birth cohort. The top panels report consumption with
discretionary subcategories that have been found to follow similar patterns. The top left panel
plots total expenditure, the top middle panel plots entertainment and the top right panel plots
‘sin’ expenditure (alcohol and tobacco). The bottom panels report religious contributions next
to other types of contributions that one might, a priori, believe to be of similar ilk - charitable
contributions and political contributions.14
14One can consider the following question: “Would you rather give an extra dollar to a political party on the day
17 
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Fraction Contributing and Median Contributions By Age
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 The top panels demonstrate the traditional ‘hump-shaped’ life-cycle proﬁle of consumption.
That is, consumption increases over one’s life-cycle until around the age of 45 to 50, then, household
consumption begins a steady descent until death. The top left panel demonstrates this pattern for
total consumption whereas the middle panel demonstrates this pattern for entertainment expendi-
tures. ’Sin goods’ (alcohol and tobacco) decline with age though there appears to be substantial
cohort eﬀect (with younger cohorts consuming less alcohol and tobacco).
Alternatively, the bottom panels of the ﬁgure show some diﬀerences that we believe have
something important to say about household’s religiosity. Religious contributions do not in fact
decline around the age of 45 to 50. In fact, religious contributions continue to rise over time until
households reach retirement age. Once into retirement, there is only a slight decline in religious
giving - far less pronounced than what is seen in the top panels. The bottom middle and bottom
right panels plot what are likely close substitutes to religious giving - charitable contributions and
political contributions. These panels demonstrate a similar ‘hump-shape’ to the above panels,
although the data appears to be a bit noisier given that the dollar amount of each is smaller
than total consumption or entertainment consumption. Still, these panels demonstrate that both
charitable contributions and political contributions begin to fall around the age of 45 to 50, following
paths more similar to total consumption than consumption of religious goods.
While these empirical regularities are important for understanding the gross features of the
data, in what follows we investigate the empirical relevance of our theory. We next turn to our
data from the CEX and estimate our (after) life-cycle model of religious contributions.
In the next two sub-sections, we provide estimates of the model’s key parameters using a
number of diﬀerent approaches. As shown below, these alternative estimates have a number of
common features which indicate strongly the extent to which religious giving is tied to after-life
before your death, or to a religious organization?”
18consumption.
5.2 Estimation Using the Synthetic Cohort Panel
Our ﬁrst approach to estimating the life-cycle of religious contributions is to use the synthetic
cohort panel. A distinct advantage to this approach is that we have some data at the cohort level
which we do not have at the individual level. Importantly, we also need to control for cohort
characteristics that vary over the life-cycle such as family size and number of children. We follow
Attanasio and Weber (1995) and add a set of controls for family size and composition that will
vary by cohort over the life-cycle.15
The results in Table 2 described below use the cohort level data to estimate the tithing
(ﬂow) relationship embodied in expression (17). The major beneﬁt to this approach is that not
only can we estimate α and Ω, but we can also estimate δ/R. Following equation (17), the results
in Table 2 are the empirical estimates from the following speciﬁcation:
τit/cit = b0 + b1 · Pit+1 + b2 · Pit/(1 − Pit) + ζXti + εit (18)
b0 = α[1 − (δ/R)]
−1 [1 − (δ/Rβ)], b1 = Ω[1 − (δ/R)]
−1 , b2 = −(α + Ω)[1 − (δ/R)](δ/(Rβ))
After obtaining estimates of b0, b1 and b2 and setting the value for β, these three equations are
non-linear functions of the three unknowns: α, Ω and δ/R.16 The estimated reduced form co-
eﬃcients and the structural coeﬃcients are presented in Table 2.17 The estimates in column (I)
provide a stripped down regression where no additional variables are included other than those
indicated by the theory. The remaining columns include additional demographic variables for
other demographic characteristics: in column (II) we include measures for the percentage of the
15Note that given the linear structure of expression (12), these controls will imply shifts in the preference parameter
for α if we were able to observe the stock of contributions. This will not be true, however, for the non-linear expressions
(16) and (17).
16Note that given the estimates of the reduced form parameters, there are two solutions to δ/R: one estimate is
greater than one and the other is less than one. Following the theory we choose the estimate below one.
17The standard errors for the structural coeﬃcients are obtained using the delta method.
19cohort*ethnicity*education*region*year cell that is married (MARRIED), whereas in column (III)
we include measures of family size. These latter variables are the percent of three-member families
in the cell (FAMSIZE3) and the percent of four-member families in the cell (FAMSIZE4). In column
(IV) we include variables for religious aﬃliation, namely, the percent of individuals who are Catholic
in the cohort*ethnicity*education*year (CATHOLIC), the percent who are Jewish (JEWISH), the
percent who are protestant (PROTESTANT), and the percent who are conservative protestant
(CONS. PROT.) In column (V) all these variables are included and ﬁnally in column (VI) the log
of average income in the cell, log(Y), is included as an additional explanatory factor to proxy for
any liquidity constraints which may aﬀect the estimates of our deep parameters.18
There are a number of important ﬁndings reported in Table 2. First, as indicated by the
theory, the estimated coeﬃcient on Pit+1, b1 is positive and the coeﬃcient on Pt/(1 − Pt), b2, is
negative. Also, in all speciﬁcations, the estimated reduced form coeﬃcients b1 and b2 are statistically
signiﬁcant at or below the 0.1 level. Second, from these reduced form estimates, the estimates of
the structural parameters are all generally statistically signiﬁcant at or below the 1 percent level.
Moreover, the estimates tend to vary in a relatively narrow range across speciﬁcations. Roughly
speaking, the estimates of α, Ω and δ/R are approximately 0.01, 0.4 and 0.84., respectively. These
estimates, not surprisingly, correspond closely to those used in generating the simulations for Case
1 displayed in Figure 1. Recall that Case 1 best ﬁt the data and implied that households make
religious contributions at least in part because of their after-life (investment) value.
18Note that in the estimation procedure, the data are weighted by cell-size and the standard errors are clustered at
the cohort, education and race level (i.e. 7 × 3 × 2 = 42 clusters). Due to the latter, we do not include ﬁxed eﬀects.
Year eﬀects are possible but do not aﬀect the estimate of the main parameters of interest.
20Table 2: Flow of Giving Cohort Regression: 1982-1998
τit/cit = b0 + b1 · Pit+1 + b2 · Pit/(1 − Pit) + ζXti + εit
b0 = α[1 − (δ/R)]
−1 [1 − (δ/Rβ)], b1 = Ω[1 − (δ/R)]
−1 , b2 = −(α + Ω)[1 − (δ/R)](δ/(Rβ))
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Constant 0.010
∗∗∗ 0.004 0.010
∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001 −0.001








[1.310] [1.287] [1.180] [1.158] [1.007] [1.001]







[1.214] [1.190] [1.098] [1.071] [0.938] [0.933]
FAMSIZE3 0.000 −0.001 −0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
FAMSIZE4 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
MARRIED 0.002 0.002 0.000
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]



































[0.132] [0.125] [0.119] [0.114] [0.098] [0.095]
α 0.011
∗∗∗ 0.005 0.011
∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001 −0.001
[0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Observations 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.21
See Notes: See Table 1.
∗∗∗,
∗∗ and
∗ represent statistical signiﬁcance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. The estimated
standard errors are presented in parentheses. Note that in the estimation procedure, the data are weighted by cell-size and the
standard errors are clustered at the cohort, education and race level (i.e. 7 × 3 × 2 = 42 clusters). Cohorts are constructed
with three education classiﬁcations, two race and across 4 regions for available data years in the CEX and GSS from 1982-1998.
The education classiﬁcations are: less than high school, high school graduate, and some college. The two race classiﬁcations
are white and non-white. Included in the regressions are: the probability of death next period (Pit+1), the percent of 3 member
families in the cell (FAMSIZE3), the percent of 4 member families (FAMSIZE4), the percent of individuals who are married
(MARRIED), the percent of individuals who are Catholic (CATH), the percent of individuals who are Jewish (JEWISH),
the percent of individuals who are protestant (PROTESTANT), the percent of individuals who are conservative protestant
(CONS. PROT.), and the log of average cell income (log(Y)). δ/R,α and Ω are the estimated structural parameters in the
underlying regression. Their standard errors are obtained using the delta method.
21The results in Table 2 also demonstrate a few other noteworthy ﬁndings with respect to
demographics. First, as shown in columns (IV) through (VI), the coeﬃcients on the JEWISH
and PROTESTANT variables are statistically signiﬁcant and positive. Everything else equal, if the
fraction of a cell reporting their religious denomination as Jewish increases by 10 percentage points,
then this would indicate an approximate 0.6 percentage point higher tithing rate. A 10 percentage
point increase in the percent Protestant would lead to a 0.1 percentage point increase in tithing. By
contrast, the coeﬃcient on CONS PROT is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that a 10
percentage point increase in the percent reporting their denomination as conservative Protestant
would lead to a 0.1 percentage point lower tithing rate, while the coeﬃcient on CATHOLIC is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Second, family size variables do not seem to be important
determinants of tithing. Lastly, income is a signiﬁcant positive predictor of tithing, suggesting the
possibility of liquidity constraints that are not directly incorporated into our theoretical analysis.
5.3 Estimates Using Household-Level Data
While the results presented in Table 2 use cohort-level data, we also investigate the ﬂow tithing
relationship (18) using the micro household data in the CEX. One beneﬁt of the household-level data
is that we have a tremendous increase in the number of observations – over 85 thousand as compared
to 1,600 – although the cost is that we do not have religious aﬃliation at the household level. An
additional beneﬁt of using the household-level data is that in aggregating to the cohort-level data,
we may have suppressed some useful variation in the data. Finally, using the household-level data
we are also able to employ an instrumental variables approach to eliminate measurement error in
an individuals perceived probability of death.
Table 3 estimates the speciﬁcation in (18) using the household micro data. The estimates





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23speciﬁcation as estimated with the cohort data. The main diﬀerence is that since the cohorts used
in estimating the speciﬁcations in Table 2 are deﬁned with respect to race, region and race, we
now include these demographic factors as explanatory variables in the speciﬁcation with household
data presented in Table 3.19 For instance, the speciﬁcation reported in columns (II) includes
region dummy variables (estimated coeﬃcients not shown), while that in column (III) also includes
education (EDUC1, EDUC2, EDUC3, and EDUC4), region, gender of the head of household,
race (BLACK) and marital status (MARRIED).20 The results in column (IV) include measures of
family size (FAMSIZE3 and FAMSIZE4), while those in column (V) include the family size and
demographic characteristics presented in columns (III) and (IV). Unfortunately, since the CEX
does not have information on religious aﬃliation or religiosity, these variables cannot be included
in these speciﬁcations. However, since these variables were constructed from the GSS by matching
demographic characteristics common to the GSS and CEX, the impact from the omission of these
religious aﬃliation variables should be less of an issue than if the demographic characteristics were
not included in the regressions.21
The broad, consistent ﬁnding from the results in columns (I) through (VI) of Table 3 is that
the estimated structural parameters using the micro data are very similar to those using cohort
level data presented in Table 2. One thing to note, however, is that the estimates of Ω are slightly
lower in the micro data as compared to the cohort level data. Overall, the estimate of α, Ω and
δ/R are approximately 0.01, 0.3 and 0.83, respectively. Also, given the alternative speciﬁcation of
19For the estimates using household-level data, we cluster the standard errors by cohort (7 cohorts) and do not
include cohort ﬁxed eﬀects. However, estimating the model with cohort ﬁxed eﬀects and not clustering the standard
errors at the cohort level does not aﬀect our estimation results.
20For the household data analysis, we allow for 5 education types: the percent of individuals with high school degree
in the cohort (EDUC1), the percent of individuals with some college degree in the cohort (EDUC2), the percent of
individuals with college degree in the cohort (EDUC3), and the percent of individuals with some graduate training
in the cohort (EDUC4). The omitted classiﬁcation is the percentage of individuals with less than a high school
degree. Note that unlike the cohort regressions, the demographic controls are dummy variables equal to one if the
household head satisﬁes the speciﬁc criteria, and zero otherwise. Recall that with the cohort data, these demographic
controls represented percentages of the cell that satisﬁed the speciﬁc criteria. Also, note that as in the cohort level
regression results presented above, the death probabilities vary at the age, year, region and education levels. Finally,
the regression results are not aﬀected by the generous use of interaction terms among the demographic variables. We
exclude these simply for parsimony.
21Indeed, as seen below, the estimated value of the main parameters of interest are generally the same across the
cohort and household samples.
24demographic controls in the household data as compared to the cohort data, some interesting new
signiﬁcant variation is captured in the estimates using household data. In particular, the results
show that lower education and larger family size are related to lower tithing while both black
households and married households tithe a large amount.
In columns (VI) through (IX) we also include the log of labor income plus a dummy variable
for positive labor income in the speciﬁcation. Interestingly, using the household data, higher income
is associated with higher tithing. Like the similar results from the cohort level data, this result
suggests that while our streamlined model of religious tithing may ignore possible issues with respect
to liquidity constraints. Nevertheless, allowing for these eﬀects, and contrasting the estimated
coeﬃcients in columns (V) and (VI), the estimated structural parameters are only slightly aﬀected
by the inclusion of these income measures.22
In the last three columns, we investigate two further issues. The ﬁrst is that our probability
of death measures the average probability of death given an individual’s age and demographic
group: however, an individual head of household may have private information about his or her
own likelihood of death. Indeed, if a head of household’s true probability of death is greater than
that measured in our data, then they may be inclined to spend more on religious giving than our
model would predict.23 It is straightforward to show that using averaged data for the probability
of death, in the presence of private information by an individual about their own probability of
death, will bias our estimates of b1 and b2 in expression (18) towards zero. Hence, in column
(VII) we estimate the model using instrumental variables. The instruments we pick for the two
death probability measures are the head of household’s age, age squared and a households health
22Note that the inclusion of these terms using the cohort data in Table 2 also did not change the estimated values
of the structural parameters.
23Of course, with the cohort data, since it is averaged over households, we cannot exploit this potential property
of the data.
25care spending as a fraction of consumption spending. The results reported in the column indicate
larger estimates in absolute value for the aforementioned reduced form coeﬃcients and also larger
estimates of Ω as well as δ/R. Note that the p-value reported at the bottom of the table indicates
that the over-identifying restriction that the instruments are orthogonal to the error term is not
violated at or below the 0.1 level. These somewhat larger estimates of the key coeﬃcients are
consistent with the interpretation that individual households have private information on their
probability of death.
As a further issue, we also provide estimates for the data when we only use data for house-
holds that make a positive religious contribution. Of course, by removing the non-givers from the
data we should see larger estimates for α and Ω. The estimates in columns (VIII) and (IX) are based
on this sub-sample, and the two columns diﬀer in that column (IX) is based on the instrumental
variables procedure discussed above. To note, the estimates of α and Ω are higher: the estimate
of α rises to 0.028, and that for Ω rises above 0.5 to as high as 0.8. Moreover, the estimated value
of δ/R falls somewhat in the least squares estimates presented in column (VIII), though it returns
to its previously estimated value of above 0.8 in the instrumental variables estimates presented in
column (IX).
6 Remarks
Taken together, the estimates of the structural parameters of our model demonstrate the importance
of both within lifetime and afterlife considerations in religious giving behavior. That is, households
make religious contributions as if these contributions represent both within-life consumption and
after-life investment.
To put our results in better context, it is useful to consider a few exercises to pin down
the life-cycle forces driving religious giving. First, consider a steady state where the probability of
26death is constant, P. From expression (17), the steady state tithing ratio becomes:












In this scenario, if the probability of death is zero, the steady state tithing ratio will be τ/c =
α[1 − (δ/R)]
−1 [1 − (δ/Rβ)] which is approximately equal to α.24 In other words, the long run
level of religious giving, when the probability of death is constant over time, is driven by α (the
within lifetime utility value of the stock of contributions). Moreover, continuing to use expression
(19), whether the inﬂuence from religious giving in this life outweighs the inﬂuence of religious
giving in the next life clearly depend on the extent to which α is greater than or equal to ΩP.
Using the simplest estimate of ˆ α = 0.01 and ˆ Ω = 0.3 from column (1) in Table 3, and using the fact
that the average level of P in the household data is 0.013 suggests that ˆ α = 0.01 > ˆ ΩP = 0.003.25
Hence in the steady state, with a constant probability of death, the estimates suggest that factors
in this life are dominant inﬂuences on religious giving.
Second, a permanent increase in the constant level of the probability of death can be
interpreted by analyzing how the tithing ratio responds to a change in P. As permanent levels
of tithing are tied to α, it should come as little surprise, that the tithing ratio in this case is
substantially insensitive to changes in the constant probability. The eﬀect on the tithing ratio from
an increase in the constant likelihood of death is equal to:
dτ/c
dP


















It follows that even for suﬃciently small values of P, d(τ/c)/dP cannot be signed without knowing
the magnitudes of α, Ω and δ/R. A special case is helpful, however. Note that if P = 0 and β = 1,
dτ/c/dP =Ω − α. According to the estimates of these parameters presented above, dτ/c/dP > 0.
24If β = 1, τ/c is equal to α .
25This constant probability of death is associated with an expected life continuation of 76 years.
27That is, the tithing ratio increases as the constant probability of death increases. More generally,
using δ/R = 0.83, α = 0.025, Ω = 0.4 and β = 0.95, doubling the constant probability of death
from 0.013 to 0.026, leads to a rise in the tithing ratio from 0.0204 to 0.0214.26 As one can see,
in the parameter range that is consistent with the data, long run changes in the probability of
death are not the driving forces behind tithing. Indeed, while one might suspect that rising life
expectancy throughout the world could account for the decline in tithing rates from the biblically
inspired one-tenth, according to our model such a conclusion would be unwarranted.
As a ﬁnal exercise, consider what happens in response to a one-time, temporary, anticipated
increase in the probability of death. That is, consider the case where it+1 ≡ Pit+1 − Pit > 0. This
‘steepness’ change in an individual’s probability of death time horizon is unrelated to his or her
baseline probability of death, which was analyzed above. From expression (17), the response of the
tithing ratio today to a change in the probability of death next period will be:
d(τ/c)it
dit+1
= [1 − (δ/R)]
−1 Ω > 0 (21)
This eﬀect is clearly positive, potentially quite large, and independent of the baseline probability
of death. To get a handle on the magnitude of this eﬀect, using δ/R = 0.83, and Ω = 0.4, we
obtain that d(τ/c)it/dit+1 = 2.35. Accordingly, a household whose probability of death increases
(temporarily) by 0.1 would raise its tithing ratio by over .23, which is a very large response indeed.
This demonstrates that, in practice, an increase in the risk of death is an inﬂuential determinant
of the responsiveness of religious giving as compared to a change in the constant risk of death.
In sum, these exercises, calibrated to our empirical estimates, suggest two strong ﬁndings for
understanding religious giving at the household level. First, after-life investment considerations (i.e.
impending death) are an important determinant of the life-cycle proﬁle of religious contributions.
26Given the constant probability of death, this is associated with a decline in life expectancy from 77 years to 38
years.
28Second, within-life (i.e. religious consumption) factors pin down a household’s average level of
religious contributions over a lifetime.
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